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Research Note
Economic DEvElopmEnt anD 
GEnDEr Equality
is there a Gender Kuznets curve?
By Joshua Eastin and asEEm praKash*
IntroductIon
unDEr what conditions does economic development improve gender equality? We argue that the effects of economic develop-
ment on gender equality are contingent on the particular developmen-
tal phase. Drawing on simon Kuznets’s thesis regarding a curvilinear 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality, we sug-
gest that economic development and gender inequality also exhibit a 
nonmonotonic relationship, marked by three phases.1 in the first phase, 
economic development should improve gender equality; in the second 
phase, equality should plateau or even decline slightly; and in the third 
phase, it should rise again. our thesis has important policy implications 
because scholars and practitioners tend to assume that development 
alone will improve gender equality. the evidence we present suggests 
that in each developmental phase, particularly in the second phase, 
measures to respond to gender issues should accompany policies to 
promote economic development.
our article builds on an extensive world politics literature on the 
consequences of economic development for women’s status.2 critical 
and feminist scholars suggest that contemporary development strate-
* a previous version of this article was presented at the 2009 annual conference of the inter-
national studies association. We thank susan sell, rebecca szper, and mike Ward for comments. 
Brad Epperly and Kristan seibel provided invaluable technical assistance. Joshua Eastin acknowledges 
financial support from the harry Bridges center for labor studies, university of Washington. aseem 
prakash acknowledges financial support from the center for international Business Education and 
research, university of Washington.
1 Kuznets 1955.
2 Weiss, ramirez, and tracy 1976; clark et al. 1991; Dollar and Gatti 1999; Kanbur and spence 
2010.
World Politics 65, no. 1 ( January 2013), 156–86
copyright © 2013 trustees of princeton university
doi: s0043887112000275
 economIc development & gender equalIt y 157
3 tinker 1976.
4 Weiss, ramierez, and tracy 1976; clark 1991; clark, ramsey, and adler 1991; Forsythe, Korze-
niewicz, and Durrant 2000.
5 neumayer and Desosya 2007.
6 richards and Gelleny 2007; Gray, Kittilson, and sandholtz 2006.
7 Boserup 1970; Goldin 1990; iversen and rosenbluth 2006.
gies can strengthen patriarchal institutions, expose women to exploit-
ative production practices, and force them into low-paying jobs—all of 
which undermine gender equality.3 in contrast, neoliberals (or growth 
optimists) suggest that economic development should enhance women’s 
status because it encourages societal integration, supports women’s in-
vestment in human capital, and creates employment opportunities for 
women in relatively higher paying nonfarm sectors.4 similarly, as growth 
drivers, international trade and foreign direct investment diffuse pro-
ductivity-enhancing (and labor-saving) technologies and encourage 
norms of gender equity.5 consequently, this thinking goes, economic 
development should have a positive impact on gender equality.6
a third perspective, introduced by Boserup and developed by schol-
ars such as Goldin and iversen and rosenbluth, recognizes that while 
in the early phases of development both macropatriarchal and micropa-
triarchal institutions might limit women’s occupational opportunities, 
sustained growth should enhance female labor-force participation.7 
outside employment provides women with an independent revenue 
stream, facilitates human capital development, and strengthens their 
domestic bargaining power, which in turn should undermine patri-
archal social structures. consequently, the relationship between eco-
nomic development and gender equality is likely to follow a u-shaped 
pattern: equality decreases in the initial stages of development and then 
increases beyond some economic threshold. this is an important find-
ing because it challenges the existing literature, which tends to view 
development as either “good” or “bad” for gender equality across the 
developmental spectrum.
We demonstrate that the relationship between development and 
gender equality is even more complex—a finding with important 
policy implications. rather than an inverted u with two stages, we 
suggest that development’s effects on gender equality should resemble 
an s shape, proceeding in three stages: first increasing equality, then 
decreasing or decelerating equality, and finally increasing again. these 
findings raise important theoretical and policy issues pertaining to the 
consequences of economic development on gender issues. the policy 
implication of the u-shaped model suggests that once an economic 
threshold is crossed, development should encourage progress on gender 
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issues. in our perspective, the two-stage model overlooks the first stage 
where economic development encourages equality gains. We believe 
that this initial progress might lull policymakers and activists into be-
lieving that gender equality will only improve in the future (or that 
society is in the second stage of the u-shaped curve). indeed, our find-
ings illustrate the dangers of the middle phase, where gender gains can 
level off or even decline, and call for vigorous policy actions to serve as 
correctives. thus, the policy and political implications of the s-shaped 
perspective substantially differ from those of the u-shaped perspective.
Following Grossman and Krueger, we employ a cubic specification 
of per capita income, a primary indicator of economic development and 
the key variable of interest.8 our analyses of a panel of 146 developing 
countries for the period 1980–2005 suggest a curvilinear relationship 
between economic development and gender equality, or the presence 
of a gender Kuznets curve (gkc). We estimate the two thresholds—the 
transition from the first to the second stage and from the second to the 
third stage—to be approximately $8,000–10,000 and $25,000–30,000 
per capita, respectively.
What mechanisms might explain the gkc? to what extent are the 
transitions between stages endogenous to the growth process? Fol-
lowing Goldin and iversen and rosenbluth, we suggest that political, 
economic, and social opportunities associated with different develop-
mental stages, and the changes in household-level and macrosocial in-
stitutions they unleash, create a push for gender equality (and then a 
pushback in the second stage). in particular, labor-force participation 
affords women an independent income stream and improves their in-
trafamily bargaining power. increased human capital and higher so-
cial visibility accumulated in occupational pursuits aid this progression. 
however, these processes are refracted through patriarchal institutions 
and reactionary forces, which seek to perpetuate the status quo and 
reinforce patriarchal dominance. thus, economic, social, and political 
advancement at different developmental stages reflects the tension be-
tween social normative evolution and economic imperatives on the one 
hand and the resistance generated by the structures of patriarchal sys-
tems on the other. consequently, opportunities for gender advancement 
do not necessarily always increase or decrease as economies develop.
Goldin finds that higher levels of female labor-force employment 
tend to exist at lower income levels when agriculture dominates.9 
8 Grossman and Krueger extended Kuznets’s work to suggest a curvilinear relationship between 
growth and environmental degradation, the so-called environmental Kuznets curve. see Grossman 
and Krueger 1995. see also Zeng and Eastin 2011.
9 Goldin 1995.
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as incomes rise and manufacturing sectors gain prominence, limited 
educational opportunities and stigmatizing social customs depress fe-
male labor-force participation. however, as the service sector gains 
prominence and new educational opportunities facilitate white-collar 
employment, the opportunity cost of staying at home as opposed to 
joining the labor force increases. consequently, the stigma of joining 
the workforce diminishes and gender equality improves. in short, the 
declining portion of the u-shaped curve illustrates the dominance 
of the income effect (changes in women’s work hours in response to 
changes in family income, ceteris paribus) over the substitution effect 
(changes in women’s work hours in response to changes in her wage 
rates, ceteris paribus), while the rising portion illustrates the opposite.
our work both supports and supplements Goldin’s findings. like 
Goldin, we suggest that in the initial stages of economic development 
(below $8,000–10,000), women experience relatively greater employ-
ment opportunity gains when compared with the second developmen-
tal stage. political and social spheres eventually reflect gains achieved 
in the labor force. indeed, we find that political equality (female parlia-
mentary participation), economic equality (female labor-force partici-
pation), and a combination of political, social, and economic equality 
(Gender Development index and Gender Equality measure) exhibit 
a nonmonotonic s-shaped relationship with economic development.
to elaborate on the mechanisms, in the initial stage of economic 
development, labor-force participation enhances female domestic bar-
gaining power and affords women greater social and economic vis-
ibility.10 however, extant patriarchal institutions attempt to limit this 
advancement. in some cases, there is a backlash as these reactionary 
forces gain traction in their efforts to roll back initial empowerment 
gains. scholarly work supports this proposition. steel and Kabashima 
attribute the high levels of gender inequality evident in East asia to 
historical political-institutional carryovers that incorporated gender 
inequality in the state-sponsored modernization processes.11 in con-
temporary india the parliamentary bill to enact quotas for women in 
the national and state legislatures has caused major political gridlock.
perverse social norms may take on new life with economic prosperity. 
Drawing on national sample survey data from india, Das and Desai 
report that cultural factors influence women’s labor-force withdrawal. 
they find that as a family’s status improves, social norms that discourage 
10 on how societal institutions influence intrahousehold dynamics, see iversen and rosenbluth 
2006.
11 steel and Kabashima 2008.
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female labor-force participation gain traction because female employ-
ment can threaten family honor.12 in another study, hvistendahl re-
ports that female fetal abortions tend to follow female empowerment 
in many asian countries, because male children confer higher social 
status.13 in other words, social norms that favor male children condi-
tion female decisions to abort.14 such biases are common among the 
richer and more educated indian classes. according to the 2011 indian 
census, unfavorable sex ratios predominate in the more affluent areas 
such as Delhi (866 women per 1,000 men), punjab (893 per 1,000), 
and haryana (877 per 1,000). research based on a large sample (over 
100,000) of rural and urban households suggests this trend persists 
across provinces/states.15 to summarize, a perverse pushback effect can 
cause a plateau in gender equality or even reduce it in the second devel-
opment phase. We estimate these effects to be at their most prominent 
in the range of per capita income levels between $8,000 and $10,000.
Further increases in economic development, however, can impart 
new momentum to gender norms and social institutions that enable 
women to build on previous advancements. in the third developmen-
tal phase (beyond $25,000–30,000), education and human capital 
development and the concomitant high opportunity costs of female 
labor-force abstinence encourage greater labor-force participation and 
greater acceptance of women in positions of authority. this push to-
ward greater gender equality tends to overcome status quo opposition, 
which also begins to weaken as norms of gender equality become more 
institutionalized. although reactionary forces do not disappear, they 
lose support as structural changes in the economy create conditions 
favoring gender equality.
While the gkc hypothesis potentially explains the varying and con-
tradictory relationship between development and gender equality, we 
want to clarify an important issue before we proceed. the two inflexion 
points we report in this study are not magic thresholds that miracu-
lously create new social relationships and lead to dramatic changes in 
women’s status. the reported income thresholds are econometric es-
timations based on data from a panel of 146 countries for the period 
12 Das and Desai 1993. a similar finding is reported in a recent paper by Eswaran, ramaswamy, 
and Wadhwa 2009. at http://econ.arts.ubc.ca/meswaran/status.pdf.
13 hvistendahl 2011.
14 in the context of middle East, Blaydes and linzer 2008, 577, observe: “nevertheless, many 
muslim women support and identify with the fundamentalist islamic social and political movements 
that promote these practices and beliefs and, indeed, often willingly participate in these practices 
themselves.”
15 siddhanta, nandy, and satish B 2005. these issues have been taken up in the popular press as 
well. see, for example, Douthat 2011; and Economist 2011.
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1980–2005. With new technologies, norms, and policy interventions, 
these inflexion points can shift, and the deleterious second phase can 
shrink. human agency can, and often does, aid this process. For ex-
ample, a social movement that explicitly seeks to empower women 
can reverse trends that might erode women’s rights. such movements 
might have greater opportunities to flourish in a digital society, as the 
“car driving protest” in saudi arabia suggests. our story is really about 
economic processes interacting with social institutions, a contest be-
tween progressive and reactionary forces across developmental stages. 
Different stages encourage varying levels of gender equality via female 
labor-force participation. as economic and normative pressures for 
equality accumulate, at some “tipping point”16 (the estimated income 
thresholds) we expect new norms, institutions, and power relations to 
emerge and manifest themselves in changes to women’s status. our 
article should, therefore, be viewed as a call for concerted policy and 
social action to shorten the span of the second developmental stage, 
which is inimical to women’s rights. Development scholars and prac-
titioners should anticipate that patriarchal institutions might seek to 
reverse gains in gender equality and prepare for concerted social and 
policy action in anticipation of such pushback.
economIc development and gender equalIty:  
theoretIcal expectatIons
scholars have engaged in extensive debate about the link between eco-
nomic development and women’s social, economic, and political sta-
tus. critical, and some feminist, scholars emphasize that micro– and 
macro–social institutions limit women’s capacity to attain equal status. 
they claim that capitalist modes of development strengthen such in-
stitutions, which persist in spite of economic development.17 the im-
plication is that to change the status of women, there needs to be a 
direct intervention—or social engineering—rather than relying solely 
on economic development to do the job.18
 two strands prevail in this school of thought.19 the first suggests 
that development alone does not improve female labor-force participa-
tion or undermine occupational stratification and discriminatory cul-
tural and legal institutions. studies cite examples of female labor-force 
withdrawal as economic development increases male earnings. this 
16 cao, Greenhill, and prakash forthcoming.
17 Jütting et al. 2006.
18 Beneria and sen 1982.
19 For a more extensive treatment, see Forsythe, Korzeniewicz, and Durrant 2000.
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process obligates women to exit the formal labor markets and tend to 
household duties.20 When women do enter the workforce, they are re-
stricted to menial and low-level clerical positions that reflect institu-
tionalized gender biases.21
scholars also consider how discriminatory legal institutions and 
cultural traditions can limit women’s ability to achieve equal status.22 
youssef identifies marital and fertility characteristics intrinsic to certain 
middle Eastern cultures as highly inimical to gender equality.23 a re-
port by the united nations Development program identifies a slew of 
institutionalized and cultural practices that lead to gender discrimina-
tion.24 these include laws that fail to sanction violence against women, 
discriminatory labor laws, restrictive property laws, and subordinate 
fertility laws.25 similarly, certain fundamentalist belief systems discour-
age female employment, which diminishes intrahousehold bargaining 
power. Women themselves sometimes support these same discrimina-
tory beliefs because holding such views can increase a woman’s “value” 
in the “marriage market.”26
the second strand of the critical school suggests that certain types of 
economic development erode gender equality.27 Dependency scholars 
note that the recruitment of males into the formal labor force leads to 
male out-migration to urban areas. this process denies women oppor-
tunities for upward social mobility and formal employment, because it 
forces them to remain at home and focus on agricultural and repro-
ductive pursuits. if formal labor-force participation is possible, labor 
discrimination and female confinement to menial and subordinate po-
sitions reinforces preexisting notions and practices of inequality. these 
discriminatory practices can be cultural, as mentioned above, but they 
can also arise from gender specialization in the division of labor. For 
example, economies dependent on export agricultural production can 
be more accepting of patriarchal norms that favor men over women.28
in contrast to the critical school, the “optimists,” informed pri-
marily by neoclassical economic theory, expect labor-force inequali-
20 Wilensky 1968.
21 oppenheimer 1970; Blackburn and Jarman 2006. indeed, the European parliament is contem-
plating legislation that mandates a 40 percent quota for women on company boards to resolve their 
poor representation, which stands currently at about 9.7 percent. see http://euobserver.com/18/32598.
22 youssef 1972; Folbre 1986.
23 youssef 1972. For a different perspective, see ross 2008.
24 united nations human Development report 1995.
25 united nation human Development report 1995.
26 Blaydes and linzer 2008.
27 tinker and Bramsen 1976; Ward 1984.
28 iversen and rosenbluth 2005.
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ties to decline with economic growth because discriminatory policies 
are costly to maintain. in some cases, favoring men over women can 
impose unnecessary costs on employers.29 labor-saving technologies 
allow women to devote less time to domestic and agricultural duties, 
thereby enabling them to seek outside employment or focus on skill 
acquisition.30 households find it increasingly worthwhile to educate 
girls to turn them into income-generating assets.31 these dynamics 
should lead to higher levels of female empowerment within the fam-
ily as women contribute a rising share of family income.32 similarly, 
inglehart argues that the postmaterialist values that develop concomi-
tantly with expanded educational opportunities and increased literacy 
rates encourage the adoption of social norms that discourage gender 
discrimination.33
Boserup was among the first to articulate the possibility of a non-
linear relationship between growth and gender equality.34 she recog-
nized that some stages of industrialization correlate with declining 
gender equality as male out-migration forces women to focus on do-
mestic chores. however, as growth proceeds and households become 
less dependent on subsistence farming, women gain opportunities to 
pursue external employment. From the demand side, industrialization 
and growth increase macrolevel demand for labor. as birth rates de-
cline and female human capital development increases through educa-
tion, job training, and formal labor-force participation, women achieve 
greater monetary leverage within the domestic family structure. over 
time, this process should encourage the adoption of social norms that 
discourage gender discrimination, and these, in turn, should enable 
greater political recognition, participation, and social equality.
Empirical studies testing Boserup’s thesis have produced mixed re-
sults and tend to suffer from limited comparative data.35 Forsythe et al. 
find support for the gkc in some regions and levels of income and sup-
port for a positive linear relationship (between development and gen-
der equality) among others.36 to the best of our knowledge, our study is 
the first to systematically test the gkc hypothesis for a panel of a large 
number of countries (146) over an extended time period (1980–2005), 
29 sarasúa 2008.
30 Weiss, ramirez, and tracy 1976; clark, ramsby, and adler 1991; inkles and smith 1974.
31 Becker 1985; mincer 1958.
32 seguino 2007.
33 inglehart 1977; inglehart 1997.
34 Boserup 1970.
35 Boserup 1970; lantican, Gladwin, and seale 1996; Forsythe, Korzeniewicz, and Durrant 2000.
36 Forsythe, Korzeniewicz, and Durrant 2000.
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using multiple indicators to capture social, political, and economic di-
mensions of gender equality. our results reveal a consistent curvilinear 
relationship between our indicators and economic development.
theoretically, we suggest that gkc is a useful and powerful way to 
think about the relationship between development and gender equal-
ity. Kuznets postulated the curvilinear relationship between economic 
development and income equality.37 since that time, scholars have 
extended the Kuznets curve idea to other areas—environmental pol-
lution, for example.38 the core insight in the different Kuznets curve 
literatures is that the effect of economic development on the variable 
under study is contingent on the level of development. consistent with 
Grossman and Krueger, we hypothesize that development and gender 
equality should exhibit an s-shaped, nonmonotonic pattern: first in-
creasing as economic development confers improvements in economic, 
social, and political rights, then plateauing or declining as discrimina-
tory institutions limit women’s developmental opportunities.39 Finally, 
as income increases beyond a certain threshold, it leads to the evolu-
tion of new norms and institutions that support gender equality. this 
process becomes self-reinforcing as women develop the human capital 
necessary for continued advancement in the labor force.
Economic and social institutions at both the microlevel (household) 
and the macrolevel (society) play an important role in our theoretical 
story. in the first stage, technological progress and declining birth rates 
increase female employment opportunities in both the formal and the 
informal sectors.40 these factors also increase the opportunity costs of 
remaining outside the labor force, making staying at home relatively 
more costly. at the household level, external employment gains en-
able women to increase their share of family income and therefore 
their bargaining power within the family.41 households are willing 
to invest in educating their daughters because increased income re-
duces dependence on female labor for household chores and because 
increased revenue offsets educational costs. at the societal level, pro-
motional opportunities and human capital developed in the workforce 
empower women and confer new political, social, and economic rights. 
Deere documents the implications of women’s employment in nontra-
ditional agricultural export sectors across latin america.42 she notes: 
37 Kuznets 1955.
38 Grossman and Krueger 1995; cao and prakash 2010.
39 Grossman and Krueger 1995.
40 mummert 1994; Goldin 1995.
41 iversen and rosenbluth 2006.
42 Deere 2005.
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“[t]he main way that wage work has contributed to women’s poten-
tial empowerment is through the greater bargaining power that their 
household monetary contributions garner them.”43 similarly, mum-
mert found that employment opportunities in the mexican strawberry 
industry have enabled women to develop a greater freedom of mobility, 
as well as an increased decision-making capacity within the home on 
issues such as childbearing, marriage, and occupational involvement.44 
such employment opportunities reinforce the gains made in this area 
as women begin to assume greater occupational leadership roles as su-
pervisors and/or union organizers.
in effect, social rights and norms that encourage gender equality evolve 
in the household as women gain access to independent revenue streams 
and in society as women develop human capital and acquire positions of 
occupational power. these processes increase political participation and 
representation, and expand social networks. thus, the first stage of eco-
nomic growth facilitates a relative improvement in gender equality.
advances in gender equality in the initial stages of economic de-
velopment, however, do not continue indefinitely. social and cultural 
institutions endogenous to economic development processes play an 
important role in limiting gains in the second stage. While develop-
ment in the first stage increases the opportunity costs of women ab-
staining from formal employment, gains in female income should not 
be expected to correlate with those of men because sexual stratification 
and discrimination in the labor force limit women’s advancement. in 
the household, diverging male/female income trajectories decrease the 
relative opportunity costs of women remaining home and lend trac-
tion to preexisting social norms that stigmatize men whose wives are 
employed.45 an empirical study documents the above dynamics in 
the context of women’s economic and social dependency in nizhnii 
novgorod, russia. the author finds that although entry into the for-
mal labor force enhances women’s personal freedoms, it also reinforces 
preexisting gender inequalities.46 another study finds that economic 
development has both positive and negative impacts on female em-
ployment in sri lankan export processing zones, because while in-
creased income generates greater economic capacity and female bar-
gaining power, it simultaneously supports gendered subordination.47 in 
43 Deere 2005, 54
44 mummert 1994.
45 Goldin 1990.
46 Balabanova 2007.
47 hancock 2006.
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this context, growth is a double-edged sword, initially creating oppor-
tunities but then also limiting them.
this process plays out in broader social spheres as increased female 
bargaining power threatens extant patriarchal institutions, which in 
turn push back against equality gains achieved in the initial phase of 
development. Declining opportunity costs of female labor-force ab-
stinence lend traction to arguments made by status quo beneficiaries, 
and calls to return to “traditional values” come to dominate the so-
cial discourse. scholars have observed this phenomenon in the middle 
East, noting: “With respect to gender norms, newly urbanized popu-
lations found it difficult to accept the changing role of women that 
accompanied modernization, particularly as women began to work in 
nontraditional areas.”48 arguably, this pushback might also result from 
increased competition as newly trained and educated women compete 
with men for scarce job openings.
ultimately, however, continued economic development should again 
encourage gains in gender equality. While the second stage of develop-
ment encourages female workforce retrenchment, which limits gender 
advancement, this process should not necessarily lead to declining fe-
male educational participation. Daughters continue to attend school, 
which increases their human capital and heightens the future value of 
their participation in the workforce. over time investments in educa-
tion and human capital development again increase the opportunity 
costs of female labor-force abstinence, and arguments that support pa-
triarchal dominance lose ground to the possibility of greater gains in 
family income. at the societal level, increased economic clout, social 
visibility, and human capital development encourage new social insti-
tutions and norms that supplant prior structures of cultural, social, and 
legal discrimination. this process advances women’s political rights, as 
women gain a footing in the political domain and adopt leadership 
roles at work and at home. this stage could signify the beginning of 
the “postmaterialist values” in a gendered context that “de-emphasize(s) 
the instrumental rationality that characterize(s) industrial society.”49 in 
this phase, economic development both diminishes the institutional 
desirability of gender discrimination and facilitates a shift in social 
value systems toward gender equality.
48 Blaydes and linzer 2008, 579.
49 inglehart 1997, 5.
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data and varIables
to test the gkc hypothesis, we have compiled a cross-sectional, time-
series data set covering 146 developing countries for the period 1980–
2005. 50 to the best of our knowledge, this research note provides one 
of the most comprehensive assessments of the impact of economic de-
velopment on alternative measures of gender inequality in developing 
countries. to deal with the issue of missing data, we employ a multiple 
imputation procedure using the “amelia” package in r specifying both 
time and country fixed effects for each imputed variable. this proce-
dure allows patterns in each variable to vary over time and among each 
cross-sectional unit, which should result in a more robust imputation. 
in the imputation procedure, we employ a range of variables highly 
correlated to our independent and dependent variables of interest that 
we do not include in our models to further increase the imputed da-
ta’s robustness. We place a lower bound of zero on per capita gdp to 
avoid estimating models with significant and unrealistic outliers. We 
run models on both imputed and nonimputed data with no significant 
differences in key results, leading us to conclude that the imputations 
successfully predict the missing observations.
dependent varIables
our dependent variable captures different dimensions of gender equal-
ity.51 We adopt the united nations definition of gender equality: “…
that [women’s and men’s] rights, responsibilities and opportunities will 
not depend on whether they are born male or female.”52 We employ 
four dependent variables to capture economic, social, and political di-
mensions of gender equality. these are:
1. the united nations Gender-related Development Index,
2. the united nations Gender Equality Measure 53
the above indices present a composite assessment of gender equal-
ity along social, economic, and political dimensions. Because economic 
growth may affect these dimensions in different ways, we test our hy-
50 We employ the international monetary Fund’s classification, including both “emerging” and 
“developing” economies in the sample: Imf Emerging and Developing Economies list. World Eco-
nomic outlook Database 2008.
51 sudarkasa 1986; richards and Gelleny 2007.
52 human Development program. Gender Definitions. at http://www.spc.int/hdp/index.php? 
option=com_content&task=view&id=31&itemid=53, accessed December 12, 2011.
53 For detailed descriptions of the gdI and gem, see united nations: Gender-related Development 
index and Gender Equality measure. at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/gdi_gem/, accessed 
June 2, 2008.
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pothesis on two individual indicators of these dimensions from the 
World Bank’s World Development indicators data set:
3. economic and social equality: female labor-force participation,
4. political equality: female parliamentary participation
to elaborate, the Gender-related Development Index (gdi) is a gendered 
alternative to the well-known human Development index (hdI). the 
gdI employs standardized data culled from national sources. as a com-
posite index, the gdI gauges the relative (to men) status of women in 
three areas: health and longevity (the ratio of women’s to men’s life ex-
pectancies at birth), knowledge (female/male ratios for adult literacy 
rate and primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment), and standard of 
living (female/male ratio of per capita gross domestic product). higher 
gdI scores reflect higher levels of gender equality. the methodology 
used to construct the gdI imposes a penalty for countries when the 
overall achievement level of both women and men falls and/or when 
the relative disparity between women and men increases.
 While the gdI gauges relative status of women according to ba-
sic structural characteristics, the Gender Empowerment Measure (gem) 
evaluates the extent to which women and men can equitably partici-
pate in political and economic life and in decision-making processes. 
the un notes: “While the gdI focuses on expansion of capabilities, 
the gem is concerned with the use of those capabilities to take advan-
tage of the opportunities of life.”54 Further, the “gem is more ambitious 
as it aims to measure women’s empowerment on a global scale . . . built 
on . . . indicators measur[ing] the female share of political power (seats 
in parliament), managerial positions in the administrative and profes-
sional sectors . . . [and] income.”55 the gem measures inequality on 
three dimensions, economic participation and decision-making power (the 
share of females occupying professional and technical positions, posi-
tions in the legislature, senior officials, and managers), political partici-
pation and decision making (share of female parliamentary seats), and 
power over economic resources (ratio of female to male estimated earned 
income).56
our two remaining variables approximate a key dimension of gender 
equality and women’s status. Female Parliamentary Participation mea-
sures the percentage of women in a country’s primary legislative body. 
54 united nations: Gender-related Development index and Gender Equality measure. at http://
hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/gdi_gem/, accessed June 2, 2008.
55 charmes and Wieringa 2003, 419.
56 united nations: Gender-related Development index and Gender Equality measure. at http://
hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/gdi_gem/, accessed June 2, 2008.
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parliamentary participation is a key indicator of the extent to which 
women occupy positions of political power in a country, which can ap-
proximate gender equality in the political sphere. Labor Force Participa-
tion reflects the percentage of women in a country that participate in 
the formal labor force. though labor-force participation underreports 
women’s contribution to overall production efforts, it is the key vehicle 
for economic empowerment for two reasons: first, because participa-
tion affords women an independent income stream, which improves 
their intrahousehold bargaining power; and second, because it allows 
women to accumulate human capital, which lends them greater social 
and economic visibility.
key Independent varIable
our key independent variable is economic development measured in 
terms of gdp per capita in constant us dollars (2000). We also es-
timate models by employing gdp per capita adjusted for purchasing 
power parity and find that the substantive results did not change. to 
test for a curvilinear relationship between development and equality, 
consistent with the environmental Kuznets curve literature, our models 
include quadratic and cubic specifications of per capita gdp.57
control varIables
to account for alternative mechanisms that might affect gender equal-
ity, our models include a slate of control variables. We control for po-
litical and social factors that can independently affect gender equality. 
We control for democracy because it is often assumed that democratic 
regimes have greater respect for human rights, including women’s 
rights, relative to authoritarian regimes. We draw data from the Polity 
IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002 
data set.58 these data are ordinal and range from –10 (strongly auto-
cratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). next we control for conflict. Gen-
der equality suffers in conflict situations through direct victimization 
of women and indirect spousal and child loss.59 prolonged periods of 
conflict can also limit a society’s capacity to cultivate and develop social 
norms and invest in social programs that promote gender equality.60 
We control for a country’s involvement in international or domestic 
conflict by including a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a country was 
a participant in a conflict and 0 if not. the data are from the Uppsala 
57 For information on the environmental Kuznets curve, see Grossman and Krueger 1995.
58 marshall and Jaggers 2005.
59 Gangoli 2006.
60 Jansen 2006.
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Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute (ucdp-
prIo).61 this data set defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility 
that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”62
our models control for economic factors that may influence gender 
equality. recent empirical work finds that globalization can improve 
gender equality because trade and foreign direct investment (fdI) gen-
erate employment opportunities for women.63 other scholars contend 
that policies designed to increase trade and fdI inflows reduce state 
revenue and therefore diminish the state’s capacity for social service 
provision.64 Because women are often the key beneficiaries of these ser-
vices, economic integration can undermine gender equality. Further-
more, economic integration can solidify gendered occupational segre-
gation, which forces women into poorly paid jobs.65 We control for 
level of exports (as a percentage of gdp) and fdi (inward fdI stock /gdp) 
without assuming a prior position on their directionality. We employ 
trade data from the World Bank’s WDI Dataset and fdI data from the 
united nation’s Foreign Direct Investment Database.66
We control for a country’s participation in structural adjustment pol-
icy (sap) imposed by the international monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. these policies require governments to balance budgets, usually 
by cutting expenditures. Budget cuts often reduce social service provi-
sion and public sector employment. Because women tend to benefit 
disproportionately from these services, saps can have profound conse-
quences for gender equality.67 We control for a country’s sap participa-
tion in a given year by including a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the 
country operated under an sap and 0 if not.68
our models control for the industrial composition (industry) of the 
economy as reflected in the share of manufacturing sector in the gdp. 
this is because a higher salience of the manufacturing sector could be 
associated with higher levels of formal female labor-force participa-
tion. Finally, we include economic growth to control for the possibility 
61 Gleditsch et al. 2002.
62 harbom 2007, 4.
63 apodaca 2001; richards, Gelleny, and sacko 2001; richards and Gelleny 2007; Gray, Kittilson, 
and sandholtz 2006.
64 hemmati 2001; rao, aruna, and Kelleher 2005.
65 united nations Development program 1999.
66 united nations conference on trade and Development: Foreign Direct investment Database. 
accessed June 18, 2008.
67 Bergeron 2001; acker 2004.
68 abouharb and cingranelli 2006.
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that an economic slowdown or decline might have adverse effects on 
gender equality independent of the level of development. We take data 
for industry and economic growth from the World Bank’s WDI Dataset. 
(see table 1.)
model, analysIs, and results
We estimate the effects of economic development on four dependent 
variables that capture a diverse picture of gender equality and women’s 
status. Each variable represents a different facet of political, social, and 
economic gender equality. We employ linear mixed-effects models 
(with polynomials) with country random effects. We run all models 
with both per capita income and per capita income adjusted for pur-
chasing power parity, our key independent variables. the results were 
substantively the same, which is not surprising, given that these vari-
ables are highly correlated (0.87). all dependent variables (gdi, gem, La-
bor-Force Participation, and Female Parliamentary Participation) can be 
viewed as continuous. however, because these variables are bound by 1 
and 0, we also run models using logit-transformed dependent variables. 
these results are substantively the same, with no major differences in 
the significance of the variables of interest across all models. We re-
port the results from nontransformed variables to facilitate substantive 
table 1
descrIptIve statIstIcs
 GDP SAP Democracy Conflict Exports FDI Industry Growth
mean 2.4 0.48 0.42 0.18 36.08 28.99 30.64 3.43
median 1.19 0 0.70 0 31.92 14.41 28.73 3.92
sD 3.76 0.5 6.56 0.39 21.26 80.88 13.43 7.46
min 0.04 0 –10 0 1.1 –130.16 0.79 –51.03
max 45.39 1 10 1 131.13 2036.99 94.21 151.83
1st q. 0.42 0 –7 0 19.58 5.29 21.08 0.95
3rd q. 2.87 1 7 0 49.07 33.09 38.31 6.33
        
 GDI GEM Labor Parliament 
mean 0.60 0.38 38.36 9.67    
median 0.63 0.39 40.13 8.66    
sD 0.17 0.11 9.22 6.81    
min 0.11 0.04 5.05 0    
max 0.98 0.78 55.71 48.80    
1st q. 0.47 0.30 33.21 4.32    
3rd q. 0.73 0.46 45.62 13.20    
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interpretation.69 Durbin-Watson test statistics do not indicate a sig-
nificant danger of autocorrelation in any of the models, and correlation 
statistics do not indicate that multicollinearity is a danger. Finally, we 
run all models with independent variables with one-, three-, and five-
year lags to mitigate endogeneity concerns.70 Because none of these 
models significantly affected our key results, we report the models with 
no lags to avoid diminished sample sizes.
Figure 1 displays the relationship between development and vari-
ous dimensions of gender equality. We constructed these graphs us-
ing the coefficients obtained in the regression equations. the X-axis 
represents per capita income (in thousands of dollars), and the y-axis, 
the gender equality variables. these graphs enable assessment of effects 
of development on gender equality at each developmental stage. We 
structure the dependent variables on the y-axis such that increases, or 
movements up the axis, represent equality gains. the inflexion points 
(marking different phases in the evolution of gender rights) for the 
hypothesized curvilinear relationships are around $8,000–$10,000 and 
$25,000–$30,000.
table 2 presents the results of our statistical analyses. We find evi-
dence that per capita income (including its squared and cubed forms) 
is a significant predictor of gender equality across models. F-tests com-
paring models that include the quadratic and cubic terms with those 
that include only the linear term indicate that the full models provide 
a better fit. the directionality of these variables corresponds with the 
gkc hypothesis (+, - ,+) of an s-shaped relationship between economic 
development and gender equality. our statistical findings are consis-
tent across all alternative measures of gender equality, giving us further 
confidence about the robustness of the gkc argument.
We performed additional robustness checks to increase confidence 
in our findings. specifically, we estimated a generalized additive model 
(gam) with a nonparametric regression spline to assess the hypothesized 
nonlinearity in per capita gdp.71 the results of the gam model provide 
additional support for our contention that economic development ex-
hibits a nonmonotonic relationship with gender equality. nevertheless, 
69 results from both the transformed and nontransformed models, as well as other alternative 
estimations, using imputed and nonimputed data are available in our online appendix; Eastin and 
prakash 2012.
70 although we experimented with independent variable lags, human capital development arguably 
affects economic growth, which can create an endogeneity problem. theoretically, an endogenous re-
lationship should depict a monotonic relationship between human capital development and economic 
development. however, in the second stage of our analysis, we do not find that declines in gender 
norms have concomitant effects on growth. though there may be some reciprocity in the first and 
third stages, we are confident that an endogenous relationship is not driving the full range our analysis.
71 For further information on generalized additive models, see Wood 2000; and Wood 2004.
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the statistics and graphs we present indicate that the polynomial model—
a linear mixed-effects model—provides a much better fit for the data. 
We compare the models in two key ways. First, we graph the actual 
versus the fitted values of both models on the full data set. these dis-
plays provide strong visual evidence that the polynomial mixed-effects 
model provides a better fit for the data than the gam. comparisons of 
each model’s Bayesian information criterion (bIc) support this conten-
tion, as each of the polynomial model’s bIc statistics is lower to a highly 
statistically significant degree (p <= .0001). 72
second, we perform a twofold out-of-sample cross-validation tech-
nique on both models to assess how each model’s results generalize to 
an independent data set. 73 out-of-sample cross-validation procedures 
protect against errors associated with confirming hypotheses suggested 
by the data, because they use only the data that suggested these hypoth-
eses in the first place. For this technique, we randomly divide the full 
data set into two subsets of equal size: a training set and a test set. We 
first estimate the models using the training set and then assess them on 
72 For information on the bIc, see schwartz 1978; and raftery 1995.
73 For further information on cross-validation, see Fox 1997; and Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke 
2010.
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the test set to measure model fit on independent data. We then repeat 
the procedure by reversing the roles of the two sets. visual comparisons 
between the fit of polynomial model data on the full data set and on 
the out-of-sample data set in Figures 2–5 indicate that the polynomial 
models provide an excellent fit and possess striking predictive accuracy. 
similarly, comparisons between the polynomial and spline models il-
lustrate visually the superiority of the former over the latter. Finally, the 
polynomial model is simpler and more parsimonious than the spline 
model, which makes it more useful for substantive interpretation.
table 2
lInear mIxed effects models 
Gender
Development
Index
(Model 1)
Gender
Equality
Measure
(Model 2)
Female
Labor-Force 
Participation
(Model 3)
Female
Parliamentary
Participation
(Model 4)
intercept 0.514***
(0.012)
0.340***
(0.009)
37.776***
0.798
7.121***
0.622
per capita GDp 1.855***
(0.250)
1.514***
(0.220)
95.903***
10.151
71.745***
17.225
per capita GDp2 –0.058**
(0.019)
–0.059***
(0.016)
–5.728***
0.750
–3.603**
1.293
per capita GDp3 0.007*
(0.003)
0.008**
(0.003)
0.752***
0.125
0.493*
0.216
sap –0.008***
(0.002)
–0.007***
(0.002)
0.217*
0.084
0.161
0.154
Democracy 0.172***
(0.022)
0.130***
(0.020)
4.682***
0.863
6.773***
1.559
conflict –0.008*
(0.003)
–0.011***
(0.003)
0.058
0.122
–1.498***
0.222
Exports 0.072***
(0.010)
0.072***
(0.009)
1.192**
0.387
2.435***
0.692
FDi 0.024***
(0.002)
0.019***
(0.001)
0.181**
0.062
1.374***
0.112
industry 0.064***
(0.015)
–0.034**
(0.014)
–4.444***
0.599
1.194
1.073
GDp Growth 0.069***
(0.012)
–0.024*
(0.011)
1.328**
0.473
–0.982
0.863
3593 observations
***p > .001, **p > .01, * p > .05; figures in parentheses are robust standard errors
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linear mixed Effects model
(with polynomials)
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Generalized additive model
(with spline)
rmsE = 0.10
Bic = –6,086
rmsE = 0.10
rmsE = 0.049
Bic = –10,493
rmsE = 0.053
0.2     0.3   0.4    0.5    0.6    0.7    0.8    0.9
Fitted values
0.2     0.3   0.4    0.5    0.6    0.7    0.8    0.9
Fitted values
0.2     0.3   0.4    0.5    0.6    0.7    0.8    0.9
Fitted values
  0.3      0.4       0.5       0.6      0.7       0.8       0.9
Fitted values
fIgure 2 
gender development Index model fItsa
a rmsE is root mean square error.
turning to the effects of the control variables on gender equality, 
we find contradictory evidence regarding the effects of saps on gender 
equality. this variable is significant and negatively associated with the 
gender indices in models 1 and 2 but significant and positively associ-
ated with Labor in model 3. Because the first two variables are indices, 
it is difficult to interpret what specific aspect of gender equality is neg-
atively associated with sap adoption. the positively signed and highly 
significant coefficient of saps in model 3 suggests that a reduction in 
governmental expenditures, often in social programs, necessitates a 
greater need for women to earn income outside the home. Democracy is 
positive and significant across all models, confirming the voluminous 
findings in earlier work. Conflict exhibits a strong negative relationship 
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with gender equality in all except model 3 (Labor). this relationship 
also confirms earlier work that suggests conflict is highly detrimental 
to gender equality. indicators of economic globalization, Exports and 
fdi, have highly significant and positive effects on gender equality in 
all models. these results are consistent with prior studies that report 
a significant and positive impact of economic globalization on gender 
equality.74 surprisingly, however, the Industry variable, which measures 
the salience of the manufacturing sector in the economy, has strong 
and negative effects in model 3 (Labor). arguably, this finding can 
linear mixed Effects model
(with polynomials)
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Generalized additive model
(with spline)
rmsE = 0.084
Bic = –7,466
rmsE = 0.083
rmsE = 0.044
Bic = 11,334
rmsE = 0.046
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Fitted values
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Fitted values
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Fitted values
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Fitted values
fIgure 3 
gender equalIty measure model fItsa
a rmsE is root mean square error.
74 richards and Gelleny 2007.
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reflect the impact that industry has on labor-force stratification, or it 
may indicate that women are simply required to stay at home while 
men work in the formal labor force (the income effect outweighing the 
substitution effect, as Goldin suggests). While Growth appears to sig-
nificantly influence gender equality, the directionality is unclear. Growth 
has a positive effect on gdi and Labor, and a negative effect on gem. this 
suggests that while growth can increase female labor-force participation 
by providing more jobs overall, the types of jobs that growth provides 
might reinforce gender segregation and subordination that can ad-
versely affect equality gains.
linear mixed Effects model
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fIgure 4 
female labor force partIcIpatIon model fItsa
a rmsE is root mean square error.
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conclusIons
simon Kuznets’s insight that the effect of economic development on 
income inequality is contingent on the levels of development travels 
well to the context of gender equality. We present evidence to suggest 
economic development and gender equality have a curvilinear relation-
ship—a discernible s-shaped gender Kuznets curve. this challenges 
both the feminist and the neoclassical perspectives, both of which 
identify the effects of development on gender equality as monotonic 
or unidirectional. it builds on and develops prior work that reports 
a u-shaped relationship. it is our hope that this article will motivate 
policy action, especially in the second phase. the inflexion points we 
linear mixed Effects model
(with polynomials)
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female parlIamentary partIcIpatIon model fItsa
a rmsE is root mean square error.
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report are not magic thresholds. our story is about economic develop-
ment interacting with social institutions to alter fundamental political 
relationships between genders. While the estimated inflexion points 
reflect the experience of 146 countries for the period 1980–2005, we 
hope that new technologies, norms, and social action will shift inflex-
ion points in ways that will shrink the second phase.
any kind of inequality reflects power asymmetry. over time, such 
inequality gets concretized into social norms. any force that seeks to 
alter these norms confronts the status quo—the patriarchal institutions 
and their beneficiaries discussed in our narrative. Economic growth is 
disruptive because it affords women an independent income stream, 
provides them with social and economic visibility, and allows them to 
accumulate human capital. Eventually, it creates a demand for change. 
however, change is not always forthcoming, as the second stage illus-
trates, because status quo beneficiaries seek to reverse equality gains. 
this pushback often manifests itself as a call to return to “traditional 
values.” the changing opportunity cost of women not joining the la-
bor force also affects the balance of power between progressive and 
reactionary forces. thus, we have outlined a political story of change 
that to a great extent is rooted in structural changes in the economy, 
the opportunities for women to participate in the labor force, and the 
emergence of women as actors with independent income streams.
Five important issues emerge for future research. First, this article 
has presented a macrostory about the relationship between gender 
equality and economic development. in particular, we have identified 
several mechanisms that lead to equality blowback in the second stage. 
these include cultural, economic, and social factors rooted in lower 
opportunity costs of female labor-force withdrawal and the rearticu-
lating of regressive social norms. arguably, the blowback might also 
reflect a more general phenomenon of opposition to Western norms, 
including gender norms. Future microlevel studies should assess the 
salience of different mechanisms in initiating and sustaining the blow-
back because these mechanisms could vary across political, social, and 
economic contexts.
second, our work contributes to the broader literature that examines 
nonmonotonic relationship between development and sociopolitical 
variables such as przeworksi et al.’s work on the relationship between 
income and political transitions. We hope our work will motivate 
scholars to examine how economic development might shape other 
types of sociopolitical variables ranging from policies toward different 
types of minority groups to public health issues.
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third, scholars should explore whether different sources of growth 
have varying consequences for gender equality. Would, for example, 
economic growth rooted primarily in the exploitation of natural re-
sources have the same consequences for gender equality as economic 
growth based on human capital-based industrialization? Different 
paths to economic development may empower different sectors of 
society that hold varying preferences for gender equality. this might 
have significant consequences for the economic, political, and social 
structures that influence gender equality. arguably, some developmen-
tal paths strengthen patriarchal structures and discourage women from 
investing in human capital, eventually undermining gender equality. 
thus, before advocating the view that “globalization and economic 
growth is the panacea for all ills,” free-market advocates should think 
carefully about the consequences of different growth processes for so-
cial issues and for gender equality in particular.
indeed, in recent years, intergovernmental organizations such as the 
united nations and the World Bank have argued for direct interven-
tions to create the market and other social institutions necessary for 
gender and social equality. these institutions have directed their efforts 
toward reducing structural disparities that hinder women’s access to 
and participation in formal labor markets, such as education and work-
force training, increased credit access for female-owned businesses, 
provision of low-cost renewable energy technology, and promotion of 
female agricultural cooperatives. the millennium Development Goals 
also emphasize women’s economic empowerment. 75 it remains to be 
seen how effective such interventions are at creating new opportunities 
for women.
Fourth, the subject of income thresholds or inflexion points needs 
to be explored further. Based on our data, we estimated two income 
thresholds ($8,000–10,000 and $25,000–30,000) for the curvilinear re-
lationship between development and gender equality. as the literature 
critiquing “stages of economic growth” suggests, the movement from 
one stage to another stage should not be viewed as automatic or a one-
way process. indeed, the social, political, and economic institutional 
arrangements in which the development process unfolds can influence 
these thresholds. arguably, policy interventions (which may be moti-
vated by growth beneficiaries) can modify and change some of these 
arrangements. institutional change upsets the status quo and is often 
contested.76
75 World Bank 2006.
76 north 1990.
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how might one proceed to alter these threshold levels? some might 
perceive policy measures to enhance gender equality as undermining 
other social goals. take the indian case as an illustrative example.77 For 
the last several years, the indian parliament has been unable to pass 
the 108th amendment Bill that mandates a 33 percent reservation for 
women in all legislative bodies.78 While the major national parties—
the congress, the bjp, and the communists—support this bill, it is be-
ing vehemently opposed by parties that claim to represent the interest 
of some minority groups and the so-called backward and lower castes 
(such as the lalu yadav’s rashtriya Janata Dal, mulayam singh yadav’s 
samajwadi party, and ram Bilas paswan’s lok Janshakti party). these 
opposing groups suggest that by virtue of the higher educational lev-
els and economic status of upper-caste, urban, westernized women 
(who are typically not their constituency), the latter will be the major 
beneficiaries of this bill.79 the opposing groups, that is, do not view 
“women” as an undifferentiated category and therefore demand “reser-
vations within reservations” for women belonging to the backward and 
lower castes (sc, scheduled castes; st, scheduled tribes; and the mandal 
castes). For them, caste trumps gender. the lesson is that in societies 
marked by multiple, nonoverlapping social cleavages, equality in one 
sphere might be perceived as undermining equality in other spheres. 
Future research needs to carefully examine the politics of focusing on 
specific development strategies as well policy interventions to change 
inequitable social arrangements. indeed, if the indian parliament does 
succeed in passing this bill, it would be instructive to study its subse-
quent effects on gender equality.
Finally, how norm-based globalization might affect the income 
thresholds as well as gender equality in specific development phases re-
quires careful examination. While scholars tend to emphasize the dif-
fusion of secular and liberal norms, the information revolution and the 
rise of the civil society has facilitated the diffusion of all types of norms, 
including fundamentalist norms. in several countries there is a resur-
gence of “bad civil society”80 and fundamentalist religious movements 
that challenge notions of gender equality. With competing norms,81 it 
77 hasan, sridharan, and sudarshan 2005.
78 Women’s reservation Bill possible only after 2009 polls.
79 the language used in some parliamentary debates shows the attitudes toward gender issues. a 
prominent leader argued that gender quotas are a power grab by urban, educated women—described 
as the types who had cut their hair (baal kati). the term, which translates as women who have cut their 
hair, is a derogatory term for urban, educated, westernized women.
80 chambers and Kopstein 2001.
81 sell and prakash 2004.
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is not clear which ones will prevail, why, and with what consequences 
for gender equality. this is an important issue for future research.
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